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In modern warfare, an operational commander is intimately concerned
with the quality, timeliness and completeness of his "picture" of the
tactical situation. To a yery large extent, his fortunes and those of
his assigned forces depend on his having available, when and where he
needs it, accurate data about the status, location and activities of
both his own and the enemies' forces. Similar requirements extend well
down into subordinate echelons of his command, including individual unit
commanders and even "smart" weapons.
Today, the methods by which information is acquired are remarkably
diverse. Sophisticated radar and electronic intercept equipments and a
variety of imaging and acoustic sensors on fixed, mobile, airborne and
satellite platforms send reports to the command center. Inputs from
direct observation of the commander's own personnel along with reports
from special intelligence are communicated, by a variety of means, to
the command center too. All this creates a massive and continuing
informational input to the commander and his staff. The staff, assisted
by modern automatic data processing equipments, is regularly creating and
updating their assessment of the situation in order to give the best
operational picture they can to their commander. The commander will, to
a \/ery great degree, make rational and reasonably predictable decisions
for the future activities of his forces based on the world view he has
developed from this sequence of images.
There are several important obsevations to make about this "Image
of reality" that the commander works with. First, the images he has are
never absolutely correct, that is, they contain errors. Nor are they
perfectly sharp, that is, there are always many questions that are
unanswered, or elements of contradiction or ambiguity. Secondly, a given
image grows more and more "fuzzy" the further into the future one attempts
to extrapolate it. This is because most elements of the picture are
dynamic, that is, they change (location, behavior, etc.) with time. Some
attributes of the elements may be partially constrained. For example, a
ship cannot move faster than about 30 knots. Nevertheless, after suffi-
cient time elapses most features of the picture will have total freedom
to take on any of their possible values or conditions.
This "fuzzyness in the crystal ball" axiom has a corollary. If the
commander loses, or turns off, his sensors or sources of information, his
"current image" will grow fuzzier and fuzzier with time until it is
eventually completely blurred. Put another way, a commander only maintains
his uncertainty about what is going on below its worst possible level by
virtue of the continual application of systemic resources to guarantee an
inflow of new information. Thus, sensor devices and information sources
provide constraints on uncertainty. They do this by continually importing
information to offset uncertainty's inevitable growth.
But merely gathering new information from one's own assets to combat
the growth of uncertainty may not tell the whole story. For example,
Rona [2] has described the concept of "information war" as a dominant
factor in the conduct of modern warfare. In an information war, one
(2)
s
' Rona, T. P., "Weapon Systems and Information War", Boeing
Aerospace Co., Seattle, WA, July 1976.
actively attempts to deny the enemy knowledge of his force positions,
numbers, intentions, etc. This is. done by a variety of means. Included,
for example, are cover and deception tactics, distribution of radar chaff,
decoys, false messages, etc. One also works to keep his own communications
intact and secure, but to intercept, exploit and/or jam those of the enemy.
3
One may also try to physically disable enemy C facilities and channels.
In all of this, the purpose is to try to reduce one's own uncertainty by
assuring a steady, reliable inflow of relevant information, a term we have
already described above. But moreoever, to disrupt the opposition's flow
of information and ultimately blur or distort his Image of the operational
situation. This will cause, we maintain, poor decisions on the enemy's
part thereby reducing his force effectiveness.
So far we have not mentioned directly the role of the forces themselves.
Although 1t is undeniable that accurate, timely information and reliable
rapid communications are essential ingredients for success in battle, they
must be coupled to effective fighting units in order to have any real utility.
Just as good management may be essential to a successful business, management
alone cannot realize any true results without suitable raw materials and an
appropriate workforce.
In military combat this translates into trained men, adequate transport
and effective weapons. All other factors equal, we would expect the side
with the largest force to prevail, if not in each individual battle, at least
in the overall campaign or war. Note the emphasis on all other factors being
equal. In general, we expect asymmetries, perhaps major ones, in the area of
command, and control, communications, intelligence, deception, electronic
warfare and even in tactical doctrine and perhaps strategic objectives.
At least since the time of Lanchester [3] , military planners,
historians and analysts have been interested in analytical models of
combat. With the advent of high speed digital computers, a number of
quite detailed combat simulations and wargames have evolved. But it
3
has been difficult to account for the effects of C I on the outcomes of
conflicts in spite of a realization of its critical nature. For example,
Mr. Andrew Marshall, DoD's Director of Net Assessment, said in 1977, that,
"theater models have been assessed to have virtually no utility, parti-
cularly since they lack the ability to treat the major asymmetries that
exist on both sides in tactical doctrine and the structures of command
and control. In addition, the failure of present theater models to
account for certain factors (surprise, deception, leadership, etc.) that
historically have permitted a force that is inferior in number and equip-
ment to defeat a superior one does not inspire confidence in the use of
such models" [4] . In 1980, D.P. Gaver [5] demonstrated the dependence
of statistics of force attrition on the information available to the
forces and/or their weapons, (accuracy of missile targeting data, for
(3)
Taylor, J.C., "A Tutorial on Lanchester-Type Models of
Warfare (U)", Proceedings 35th Military Operations Research Symposium,
July 1975.
v ; Theater Level Gaming and Analysis Workshop for Force Planning,
Lawrence T. Low, Vol II, 1981, SRI International, Menlo Park, CA,
Contract N00014-77-C-Q129.
(5)v
' Gaver, D.P., "Models that Reflect the Value of Information in
a Command and Control Context", Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA,
NPS-55-80-027, Oct 1980.
example). But we also note that the fortunes of the forces will, in
3
turn, have an effect on the ability of the C I system to function
effectively, not only through the fraction of the forces that remain
well coordinated and informed, but also through the portion of total
3 3
systemic assets that can be devoted to C I and counter-C tasks.
What appears as an inevitable consequence of modern military evolution
toward greater reliance on smart weaponry, extensive intelligence and
surveillance gathering sensors and high speed, high volume communications
nets is an analytical requirement to simultaneously model the time varying
behavior of the status of both the information capabilities and the force
levels of each side. These four quantities are all coupled. Together
they define the status of a conflict at any point in time.
The development and presentation of such a model, along with an illus-
tration of certain important patterns of behavior that this four-species
system can exhibit, is the objective of the remainder of our present
report.
II. Aggregate Conflict Modeling
From the Introduction, it is apparent that we wish to consider
the interaction of information (lack of uncertainty) and forces (men
and material s) on each of two sides (we shall refer to them as side X
and side Y) engaged in conflict. That is, their mutual objective will
be the attrition of each other's assets and the defense of their own.
Schematically, the interactions between the four system variables and
the independent system inputs are illustrated in Figure 2.1.
The matter of units in which the variables are measured needs
explanation. As far as the forces are concerned, we break no new ground.
According to Morse and Kimball [6]; "Each side has at any moment, a
certain number of trained men, of ships, (sic) planes, tanks, etc., which
can be thrown into battle in a fairly short time, as fast as transport
can get them to the scene of action. The total strength of the force
is determined by the effectiveness of each component part. At any stage
of war, we can say that a ship is as valuable as so many armies, that a
submarine is as valuable as so many squadrons of planes, etc. To this
crude approximation, each unit can be measured in forms of some arbitrary
unit - so many equivalent army divisions for instance." Morse and Kimball
go on to recognize that this is an oversimplification due to qualitative
and situational differences between air, sea, land, armor, etc., but that
this type of simplification is in the nature of constructing macroscopic
models of this sort (in their case, Lanchester Models). We are forced to
adopt their same point of view, as indeed are all macroscopic modelers of
complex phenomena, with regard to the forces.
^ ' Morse, P. and Kimball, Methods of Operations Research , the


























































































No less so is our need for aggregation with regard to modeling the
total state of information at any moment in time as it exists in the
"images of reality" perceived by all the commanders that are taking
decisions for allocation of their forces. The value of "knowing" an
enemy's strength and location must be placed on a common scale with
"knowing (correctly)" his intentions as well as being deceived, e.g.
"knowing incorrectly" his intentions. The matter of measuring all of
the elements of information about a conflict on a common scale, or in
common units, if you will, strikes at one of the central problems in
3
C I modeling and evaluation, namely, determining the relative utility
of various types of information. Although we recognize the extreme
simplifying nature of our approach, we must steadfastly maintain that
it is possible to conceive of an overall state of (accurate] knowledge
that each side has about the war at each given instant of time and that
the commander's decisions, and thusly the forces' performance of their
assigned missions, will on the average improve as this overall knowledge
is more complete, but will lose in effectiveness as it is less complete.
Since we clearly conceive of information as a lack of uncertainty
about the environment we may as well elect to measure it, on an macros-
copic level, in bits. It remains to determine the relative number of
bits contributed by various elements of data but this in principle seems
no more an improbable feat than determining the relative worth of a
submarine on the same scale with a squadron of helicopters.
Let us look again now at Figure 2.1. The four aggregate or macros-
copic variables that determine the state of the conflict at each instant
of time are M , I , M and I the forces and information, measured on the
x x y y
aforementioned scales of units, of sides X and Y respectively. Each of
these is not to be just a constant number, but changes during the course
8
of the conflict, that is, each is a function of time M (t), I (t), M (t) and
x x y
I (t). The units of the time scale need not be chosen to be seconds; it
may be more appropriate to measure time in minutes, hours, days or even
weeks. Since time is to be a continuous independent variable, its units
are really immaterial, however, we shall elect for the balance of this
paper to think of it in hours.
It is not really the absolute values of the state variables that
interest us in modeling as much as their rates of change. This tells us
whether side X or side Y is gaining or losing in knowledge and forces
at any given moment. It is clear from our diagram in Figure 2.1 that the
effect of side X being continually resupplied is to cause M to
A
increase (have a positive first derivative). However, we also expect
some failures. Equipment will break down, some men will grow ill or be
incapacitated in training, etc., causing M to decrease (have a negative
first derivative). Side X may also elect to divert some men and supplies
3
to strictly intelligence gathering work or men and supplies to C support
functions, similarly depleting M . These gains and loses are internal
to side X and independent of the actions taken by side Y against X.
However, we also expect side X to lose men and materials due to the
war efforts of side Y. This is combat related attritions and we presume
it will depend both on the size of side Y's force, M and on his state
of knowledge about the conflict which we are modeling with the macroscopic




In addition, we want to account for side Y's counter-C efforts
's 3
against X. These are of two types. Physical destruction of X CI
facilities and assets is one. These activities are undertaken by either
specifically designated or regular components of Y ' forces. Whichever,
we presume that the amount of effort Y can devote to these physical
counter-C activities will be a fraction (perhaps small), of his total
3 's
force. The second type of counter-C depends directly on Y informa-
's 3 3
tion about X intelligence and C system. This type of counter-C
includes deceptions, misinformation, jamming of communications and radars,
3
decoys, etc. These two types of counter-C are indicated in Figure 2.1 by
3
the arrows from M and I to I . That is, we expect counter-C
y y ^
activities will tend to reduce X s knowledge about and ability to
control the overall environment.
*s 's
However, totally independent of Y efforts, X information about
the environment grows old, and since the environment is dynamic (things
's
are always changing), X " uncertainty tends to grow with time (informa-
tion decays) as we described previously in the Introduction. These
3
natural losses, as well as counter-C information losses are offset by
"informational replenishment". This is the purpose of intelligence,
surveillance, battlefield reports, etc., as well as orders from higher
command levels that re-focus the commander's mission and responsibility.
These "natural losses" and external "informational replenishments" are
indicated in the diagram of Figure 2.1 as external inputs to and outputs
from I .
We have described the phenomena that are to be accounted for in the
model from X viewpoint. If we desire to model two modernly equipped
and organized opponents, then all the same may be said for side Y and
•
s




To summarize this section:






Side X Information Level
Side X Force Level
s
Side Y Information Level
•
s
Side Y Force Level
B. Independent Variable
1.) Time : hours (arbitrary, can be seconds, minutes, days,
weeks, etc.)
C. Replenishment
1.) Intelligence reports, battlefield reports, surveillance
reports, orders, etc.
2.) Resupply of men, weapons, transport, etc.
D. Natural Losses
1.) Increased uncertainty as information becomes dated.
2.) Equipment breakdown, troop illness and training casualties, etc
E. Combat Losses of Information
1.) Losses due to physical attacks on C I assets.
2.) Losses due to information war: jamming, deception, etc.
F. Combat Losses of Forces
1.) Attrition due to firepower of opposition. Effectiveness
3dependent on opposition's C I as well as his force level.
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III. Evolution Equations
Evolution problems are common to all the sciences; life, physical
and social/economic. Evolution theory in modern science is a mathematical
body of knowledge that can be used to model complicated real life problems.
Non-1 fnear mechanics, multiple compound chemical reactions, urban develop-
ment, population biology, ecosystems, economic growth, industrial develop-
ment and growth of pollutants, cell biology and genetic evolution are
some of the many important complex system problems to which evolution
theory has been applied.
The mathematical basis is to characterize the particular problem
with a system of n, non-linear first order differential equations. The
most general form of such a structure is,
SCt) = F (S(t), u) + Q(t) (3-1)
where S(t) is an nxl column vector of the system state variables,
S(t) are the first derivatives of the state variables and F(S(t), p)
is an nxl column vector of arbitrary growth (or attrition) functions.
Each element of F depends in some known (or modeled) way on all the
state variables and on a set of parameters u- The dependence on the
other state variables may be, and usually is, non-linear. The nxl
column vector Q(t) is the "drive" or "input" to the system, and is
assumed independent of the state variables S. If the parameters y
are not functions of time, the system is called "autonomous". If they
are functions of time, it is called "non-autonomous". [7]




In our model for modern military conflicts, S is the 4x1 column
vector S = [I M I Ml of system state variables. Q is the 4x1
~ x x y y —
column vector of replenishment rates, Q = [Q R Q R J . F, , F 9 , F~,
~ x x y y i c j
'S *S
F^ are the attrition functions for side X information, side X
's 'sforces, side Y information and side Y forces respectively. These
attrition functions are to account for natural losses and for losses (or
growth] induced by the other three system variables.
We shall presume that our system can be modeled by attrition
functions that are at most quadratic. That is, each one shall be of the
form
n n
F, (5 , u) - -S, Z, «,j Sj - .I
=i
Iy Sj (3-2)
to include product terms involving the 1 system variable with all the
n system variables plus linear terms in all the n system variables.
Loss functions of the form of (3-2), not including the linear terms,
are known as Lotka- Vol terra loss functions or sometimes just Vol terra
functions and are commonly encountered in ecosystem models [8]. The
parameter set u consists of the set of 2n coefficients {a. .} and
{a,.} for i=l,2,..n and j=l,2,..n. Thus our four-spedes model is
characterized by at most 32 parameters.
(Q)v
- May, R.M., Stability and Complexity in Model Ecosystems,
Princeton Univ Press, 1974, 2nd Edition.
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IV. A Specific Model Proposed
We wish now to construct a model within the generalized form of the
Lotka-Vol terra equations, that can account for the important interactions
of modern military conflicts described in sections I and II. The specific
system of equations we shall investigate are the following:
W4-1)
I = I [a I + Y Ml- [a I -c Ml+Q
x x
l xy y T x>' y
J L
x x xx x
J w
x
M =-M[a I +3 M 1 - [b M + d I + d I + b Ml+R
x x
L xy y xy y
J L
x x xx x xy y xy y
J x
I =-I[a I +y Ml- [a I - c Ml+Q
y y
l xy x T yx x J l y y yy y
J y
y
• n* o< *v «o
M = - M [6 I + 3 M 1 - [b M +d I +d I +b Ml+R
y y
l yx x pyx x J L yy yy y yx x yx x J y ;
These equations are seen to be of the generalized Lotka-Vol terra form;
however, only 20 of the 32 parameters that might possibly be included have
been retained. The particular interactions that we have modeled are
designated as "Conflict Model V".
A word on the notation. Greek letters designate coefficients of
quadratic terms in the model; english letters designate coefficients of
linear terms. Subscripts x and y are used to identify the interaction
variables, the first indicating the side suffering the attrition and the
second indicating the side that is the source of the attrition. For
example, 3 indicates the area fire (quadratic) attrition coefficient
's 's
of side Y forces against side X forces. A complete list of all 20
parameters plus the four source terms is presented in Table 4.1. The
model has been constructed with algebraic signs so that all the parameters
are presumed to be non-negative.
Given an initial set of force values and a set of parameters, the
solution for this system of equation will define the time history of
knowledge and forces as the conflict between the two sides evolves.
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Since there is nothing about the nature of the equations to prevent
negative values for the state variables, we must stop our solution when
one or more of the variables reaches zero. We can either declare the
conflict over, or continue the evolution with a new system.
Determining actual values for the parameters listed in Table 4.1
may be a difficult task for actual or potential conflicts. More will be
Source Terms
's
R = X information input rate
i-
R - X men, weapons and material resupply rate
A
's
Q - Y informational input rate
•
s
R - Y men, weapons and material resupply rate
Interaction Coefficients for Information Evolution
a (a ) - Deception, jamming, decoy, etc; counter-C 3 effectiveness
1
s ' s ' s ' s
of Y (X ) information assets against X (Y ) information
system.
Y Cy ) - Sabotage, command post attacks, communications attacks, etc;
xy yx
3 's ' s
counter-C effectiveness of Y (X ) force assets against
1
s ' s
X (Y ) informational assets.
a y (a ) - X (Y ) natural rate of information loss per bitx y
c (c ) - X (Y ) rate of information gain per unit of forces
xx
v yy' K ' a
devoted to information producing activities.
Interaction Coefficients for Force Evolution
5 (5 ) - Increase in loss rate of x'
s (y' s
) force due to Y*
S (X s )
xy v yx'
3
knowledge; quadratic C effectiveness coefficient.
3 (3 ) - X
S (Y s ) loss rate of forces due to Y
S (X s ) force size
xy yx




bJ " x ( Y ) nornial loss rate of men and equipment due tox y
illness, accident, equipment failures, etc.
-
's 's











vJdUY ) - Increase in loss rate of x'
s (y' s
) force due to
y' s (x' s )
xy yx





) loss rate of forces due to y'
s (x' s ) force size
(Lanchester "aimed" fire coefficient).
Table 4.1
Definition of Model V Parameters.
said about this problem in the final section. But the real value of a
mathematical model lies in its ability to analytically predict the types
of behavior that can be exhibited, and in particular to determine if this
behavior is particularly sensitive to slight variations in one or more of
the parameters.
It is now well known [May, op cit], the more species interacting in
a system of evolution equations, the mora prone the system is to unstable
behavior. This relationship between complexity and stability is an important
one for us. In an earlier paper [9] modeling the dynamics of information war
with a two-species model (equivalent to I and I of the current model), it
x y
was shown that the system was ultra-stable (also called environmentally
(9) 3
v
' Moose, Paul H., "A Dynamic Model for C Information Incorporating
the effects of Counter C3" , NPS Report 62-81 025PR, Dec 1980.
16
stable). That is, the system always returned to its equilibrium or
steady state conditions, when perturbed from that conditions, regardless
of the values of the Interaction coefficients. We shall see that such
is not the case for the four-species (I
x ,
M , I , M ) model we propose
x y y
here. Furthermore, the information war two-spedes model had but two
equilibrium points in Its two-dimensional state space, and we were able
to show that only one of the two could lie inside the physically
accessible region of the state-space. In a four-species model of the
Lotka-Vol terra type, there is a potential for 16 equilibrium points
in the four-dimensional state space. (Because not all interactions are
retained, Conflict V has 12 equilibrium points). The location of these
equilibrium points, their sensitivity to parameter variations, and the
dynamic behavior of the system in the neighborhood of the equilibrium
points is the subject of the analysis in the next section.
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V. Equilibria and Stability
An important mathematical feature of the evolution equations are
their "stationary" or equilibrium" points. These points are sets of
values for the state variables for which the net rates of change are
simultaneously zero. If the system ever reaches one of these points
it will no longer evolve without some external intervention.
If the system were linear, there would only be one equilibrium
point. In the theory of linear systems, the values of the state
variables at equilibrium are associated with the "steady state" res-
ponse of the system to the constant forcing functions, Q. However,
since our model is non-linear, it may have multiple equilibria. An
n order Lotka-Vol terra model, which is quadratic, has 2 n equilibrium
vectors if all interaction terms are present. Thus, a four-species
model has at most 16 distinct equilibrium vectors. In Model V, there
are at most 12 because only 20 of the 32 possible interaction terms
seemed to have physical interpretation for coupling the informational
and force variables.
Determining the equilibrium points is in general a yery difficult
problem. For a given set of coefficients, some of the equilibrium
vectors might have negative and or imaginary elements. These points
would be inaccessible to a real system. Therefore, the only equilibria
of interest to us are those that have all real, positive elements.
There is a technique by which we may determine one equilibrium as
the solution of a system of linear equations. The method is derived
t"h
for the general n
L
order Lotka-Vol terra model in Appendix A. We shall
derive it here explicitly for the four-species system, Model V that
has been proposed as a model of military conflict in the previous
section.
18









If these values are substituted Into Eqn (4-1), the
right sides are zero and hence all the rates of change are simultaneously
zero and the system is at a stationary or equilibrium point. In the same
equations, lot us .redefine the resupply rates and linear coefficients
as follows:
Q = Q I aH
x x ye
aL = a I
x x xe
c = c I \
xx xx xe
R=RM Q ,b=bM.d =dM , d =dM , b = b Mx x xe ' x x xe xx xx xe xy xy xe ' yx xy xe
xy xy ye K - a I c = cyy yy ye >5-l
R=RM , b = b M , d =dM , d =dM , b = b M





That is, we replace all the coefficients with tildes over them by
untilded coefficients multiplied times the corresponding (albeit unknown)
equilibrium value for the state variable in whose evolution equation the
coefficient appears. The new system of equations are given by:
I = -I [a I + y M 1 - I [a I -C M 1 + I Q (5-2)
x x
L xy y 'xy y J xe L x x xx x
J xe^x
v '
M = -M [5 1+3 M 1 - M [b M +d I +b M ] + M R
x x L xv v
K
xv v J xe L x x xx x xy y
J xe x




.y y y y-
I = -I [a I + y M i - I [a I -C M ' + I Q
v v L vx x 'v x J v L v v vv v ve y >
(5-3)
(5-4)
M = -M [6 1+6 HI -M [b M +d I +d I +b M ] + M a R (5-5)
y y l yx x ^yx x* ye
1 y y yy y yx x yx x
J ye y
If we now equate the right hand sides to zero simultaneously when
evaluated at {I , M , I , M }, we obtain the linear system of
At At- Jf^ J
equations
,
a I +yM + a I -cM^-Q=0
xy ye l xy ye x xe xx xe x x
(5 +d )I + (3 +b )M n + d I + b M a - R =
xy xy ye ^ xy xy' ye xx xe x xe x
a I +yM + a I - c M -0=0
yx xe J yx xe y ye yy ye Hy
(<$ +d )I + (fi +b )M + d I + b M - R =v yx yx J ye VPyx uyx ; "xe yy ye y ye y j
> (5-6)
19









(6 +b )yx yx
xy xy
(5 +d ) (3 +b )






L ye. _ yJ
= (5-7)
The system (5-7) may be solved for the equilibrium values given all
the untilded coefficients, then the tilded coefficients of (5-1) can be
computed and reinserted into the original system of equations since the
equilibrium values are now known. This is a bootstrap method to find one
equilibrium point. The location of the others remains unknown.
Probably the most important application of (5-7) is the means it
provides us to establish an equilibrium point at an arbitrary location
in the state space, by adjusting 4 of the parameters. In particular,
we can easily calculate the resupply rates that are needed to establish
a stationary point for the conflict in a region of the state space that
is physically accessible. From an analytical point of view, establishing
equilibrium at {1 , 1, 1, 1} is particularly convenient. If we do this,
then we have the equations
(5-8)
a-c +a +y = Q
x xx xy 'xy Hx
d+b+d +6 +b + 3 s R„
xx x xy xy xy xy x
a-c +a +y = Q




yy y yx yx yx yx y
that must be satisfied. These relationships only apply at unity
equilibrium. Equation (5-7) must be used for the general case but it
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1s already solved for the resupply vector, given the remaining parameters
and any desired equilibrium point.
Once an equilibrium point is found, or the resupply rates are found
to establish a specified point, we know that the rates of changes are
simultaneously zero at that point and if the conflict somehow reaches 1t,
the system state variables will, in theory, change no more. However, we
are interested in discovering whether the point is stable or not. Is it
like considering a marble either in the bottom of a bowl, or on top of
an upside-down bowl. Or we may think of a pencil hanging from one end,
or standing straight up on an end. In one case, a slight tap and the
pencil falls over, in the other it returns to its original vertical
position.
Similarly, the marble given a slight displacement rolls off the bowl
in one case, but returns to the bottom, its equilibrium position, in the
other. One type of equilibrium point is said to have "neighborhood
instability", the other has "neighborhood stability". A system has "global
stability" if it returns to equilibrium from anywhere in the space. Since
we have a non-linear system, and there are multiple equilibria, we might
expect, if we displace from the local neighborhood at a given point too
far, that the system could return to a different point, much like valleys
between different ranges of hills.
Thus our first task is to examine the "neighborhood stability" of the
one equilibrium point we have found (or fixed). The standard technique
for this is to introduce a small perturbation in the equilibrium state
+ h
vector. The results are derived for the n order generalized Lotka-
Vol terra model in Appendix A. We repeat the derivation here for the
four-species system Model V proposed in the previous section. Our mathe-
matical model of system evolution is of the general form
21
S = F(S, y) + Q (5-9)
where specifically, S = [I M I Ml , and the quadratic vector functions
~ x x y y
are given in equations (4-1). The resupply vector,
0.
=
I Rv Qv R Q„] » is presumed to be constant. We now define the** x. x y y
perturbation vector s = [i m i ml as the distance from the
~ x x y y
equilibrium point, S = [I M I M ] to the point S. Note
that S = s since S is a constant. Now (5-9) becomes
S = F (S
e
+ s, y) + Q (5-10)
If we expand the non-linear functions about S in a Taylor series and
assume terms of quadratic degree and greater in s are negligible for
small perturbations, then
S = F (S
e
) + C • s + Q (5-11)




Now since S. is an equilibrium point, then F (S.) + Q = by
~ s ~ e ~ —
definition. Therefore
s = C • s (5-13)
are the linear homogenous state equations that govern the dynamical
behavior of the perturbation variables s near the equilibrium point
S . The matrix C couples those variables together and, as is
explained briefly in Appendix A, it is well known from the theory of
linear dynamical systems that its eigenvalues determine the stability
of the equilibrium point. We shall call the C that goes with our
four species model of modern military conflict the "Conflict Matrix".
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Since the specific terms retained in the model in this paper identify
it as Model V, we shall designate the corresponding matrix as "Conflict
Matrix V", or C .




(-a I -a I -y M )
x xe xy ye 'xy ye
c I -a I
xx xe xy xe -Y
I
'xy xe
d M (-b M -6 I -3 M ) (-6 -d )M (-3 -b )M
xx xe x xe xy ye xy ye' v xy xy' xe v xy xy' xe
-a I
yx ye -V !ye (-a I -a I -y M )y ye yx xe 'yx xe' c Iyy ye
(-6 -d )M (-3 -b )M
yx yx ye v yx yx ye
-d M Q (-b M -5 I -8 M )yy ye y ye yx xe yx xe'
(5-14)
Note that the elements in the conflict matrix, and hence its eigen-
values, depend on the equilibrium point as well as the system parameters.
For analytical purposes, fixing the equilibrium point at unity,
S
e
= [1 1 1 1] » establishes the somewhat simpler conflict matrix
C =
~v






-(d +6 )v yx yx'
xx

















-(b +6 +3 )v
y yx "yx'
(5-15)
The solution of the state Eqn (5-13) is of the form
4 ,P,t
, i=l ,2,3,4 , t >
j=liM-.L ru
ftJ (5-16)
The {P.}, eigenvalues of C, are the roots of the characteristic eqn,
J
D(p) = Det[pl - C]
For our four-species Model V, D(p) is a fourth order polynomial with
coefficients that depend, in a yery complicated way, on the elements of C .
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The {r. .} are constants that depend on the initial values of the
perturbation vector, s(o).
The important thing, however, are the roots {p.}, which will either
cause the perturbation to die out, if all the. Re {p.} < 0, in which case
we have "neighborhood stab.il ity", or cause the perturbation to grow if
Re {p.} > for one or more roots. In this latter case we say the system
is "unstable at S = S ". (It may be stable at another equilibrium point).
In the four species model there are four roots or eigenvalues. They
may all be real, there may be two real and one complex conjugate pair, or
there may be two complex conjugate pairs. The system is stable for a
particular combination of coefficients if all the roots lie in the Right
Half of the complex plane (RHP). Of course, if any one (or more) of the
model coefficients is varied, the roots will move about in the complex
plane. If a smooth variation of the coefficients causes one or more roots
to move into the Left Half Plane (LHP), the system is said to be "environ-
mentally unstable".
It is yery important to determine if our model exhibits, or is capable
of exhibiting this type of instability. What it suggests is the possibility
of a stalemated (stable) battle situation changing to a battle with a
decisive outcome (one side being severely depleted or wiped out) as the
3
result of only a small change in one of the model coefficients, e.g. C
effectiveness (d or d ) . In fact it is possible, that in an effort to
3
win the battle (or war), the C or firepower effectiveness might be increased,
the equilibrium point becomes unstable, but due to chance the opposition may
gain a temporary slight advantage and he is in fact able to win. We shall
see that this phenomenon, known as a "bifurcation", can indeed occur in our
system as illustrated by the example described in the next section.
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3
VI . C Effectiveness and Environmental Instability
As an illustration of dynamics of Conflict Model V, we investigate
3
the effects of variation in the linear, C -effectiveness coefficients d
(effectiveness of Y against X) and d (effectiveness of X against Y),yx
while holding all the other coefficients constant. Table 6.1 lists the
values we have selected, somewhat arbitrarily, for all the other parameters
We might note the following from Table 6.1:
1.) Only Lanchester "area fire" terms are retained. "Aimed fire" is
set to zero.
3
2.)_ Quadratic C -effectiveness terms are set to zero.
3.) The example is symmetrical except for the variable terms, d
3
and d , which may or may not be equal , and for the counter-Cyx
's 3
terms. Note that X employs pure physical destruction of Y C
assets, with no deception (y t 0, a = 0.0) whereas Y employsyx yx
pure deception and misinformation against X, with no physical
destruction (a f 0, y =0.0). This example is asymmetrical
3
in counter-C .
Let us now calculate the resupply rates in order to establish an
equilibrium point at unity; {I = 1 .0 , M = 1 .0, I = 1 .0, M = 1.0}.
AC a"
J" J
According to Eqns (5-8),
Q = 1.5x
x




= 1 ' 5 + dyx
gives the rates of resupply necessary to maintain steady state force and
information levels of 1.0 for both sides. Note that the force resupply
3
rates depend on the C effectiveness coefficients directly. For example,
if side Y can increase the effectiveness of his forces against X thru
25
Table 6.1
Model V Parameters for Example Calculations
(Variable C Effectiveness)












Diversion of Resources to C
c = 0.0 d = 0.0 c = 0.0 d = 0.0
xx xx yy yy
Lanchester Fire Effectiveness Coefficients
b = 0.0 b = 0.0 6 = 1 .0 e =1.0
xy yx Mxy Myx
3
C Effectiveness Coefficients
d = variable d = variable 6 =0.0 5 = 0.0
y parameter y parameter ' y
3
Counter C Coefficients
Physical Destruction Deception and Misinformation
y = 0.0 y = 1 .0 a = 1 .0 a = 0.0
'xy yx xy yx
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3improved C , that is Y is able to increase d , then X must resupply his
xy
forces at a greater rate, R increases, in order to maintain a constant
level of men and material in the field. This seems reasonable. Note that
each side is supplying information at a rate sufficient to make up for the
natural decay rate of information (.5), plus the losses of information due
3
to the opposition's counter-C activities.












Mx (My+0.5) -dxy I y (6-2)
I
y





M=1.5 + d -M(M+ 0.5) - d I
y yx y x yx x
In this particular example, because of the large number of zero
parameters in Table 6.1, there are only four equilibrium points, one of
which is unity. (That unity is an equilibrium point of (6-2) is easily
checked by substituting one simultaneously for I , M , I , and M and
x x y y
noting that all four equations are zero.)
It is possible to study numerically the behavior of this system of
equations quite simply by using discreet time methods and a computer.
However, we can focus this study more effectively by analyzing the
stability of the system near equilibrium as a function of d and d .
xy yx
For this we need the conflict matrix and its eigenvalues. Substituting
our parameters from Table 6.1 into Eqn (5-15), the conflict matrix for
















We have investigated the eigenvalues of this matrix for the following
two cases
:
a.) d held fixed at 1.0 and d varied from 0.0 to 2.0
xy yx
b.) d held constant at 1.0 and d varied from 0.0 to 2.0.
yx xy
The IMSL routine EIGRF was employed to calculate the eigenvalues
numerically [10].
The results of these calculations can be illustrated graphically by
plotting the locus of the eigenvalues of C in the complex plane for
the two cases described above. Figure 5.1 a.) shows the loci of the roots
for case a.) and Fig. 6.1 b.) shows the loci for case b.). Note in both
cases there are two real roots and one complex conjugate pair. The complex
3
pair moves along a constant abscissa of -1.5 as C effectiveness is varied.
These roots lead to damped oscillatory terms in the system response and
are stable.
In each case, both of the real roots begin in the left half plane, but
one moves left and the other moves right as C J effectiveness is increased.
In both cases the one moving right winds up in the RHP to become an unstable,
or exponentially growing term in the response.
In case a.), the root crosses the imaginary axis for d = d = 0.56yx yx
and in case b.) for d = d = 0.81 Thus in case a.), for d > .56
xy xy yx
(10)
"Eigenvalues and (optionally) Eigenvectors of a Real General
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Figure 6.1. Root Locus Plots for C (Eigenvalues)
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the system is unstable. In case b.) s for d > .81 the system is
xy
unstable. The cases are not symmetrical because of the asymmetrical
3
counter-C policies of the two sides.
It is quite straightforward to determine the curve in the {{d , d }
xy yx
parameter space that bisects that space into stable and unstable regions
by examining the characteristic polynomial for the C given in Eqn (.6-3).
The result is shown in Figure 6-2. (The bisecting curve happens to
be a straight line.) The two critical values from Figure 6.1 are marked
by x' s .
Figure 6 .2
Stable and Unstable Regions
of C3I Effectiveness Parameter
Space
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Returning to Figure 6.1 a.} and b.\, we note sets of eigenvalues
marked "u" for unstable and "s" for stable. These points are also
indicated in the parameter diagram of Figure 6.2. These four points in
Figure 6.2 have been investigated numerically for small perturbations
from system equilibrium using the full system of nonlinear equations (.6-2),
The Interactive Ordinary Differential Equations (IODE) package [11] and
the NPS IBM 3033 computer were utilized in these studies. We present
here some of our results for Case b.) for both the stable and unstable
points marked in Figure 6.2 as "(b-s)" and "(b-u)". The results for Case
a.) are similar.
A number of different Initial conditions were investigated and these
are listed in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3. In the stable case, Table 6.2, the
system always returns to its equilibrium value, {1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0},
although the time constants to damp out the perturbation vary, depending
on the direction of the perturbation, from as small as one time unit to
as great as 17 time units.
Figure 6.3 shows the time history of all four variables and Figure
6.4 shows the force level phase plot, M vs M , for Trial #2, a stable
y x
case with side X given on a 25?S initial force advantage. This advantage
is wiped out after approximately seven time units and the forces become
sbalanced at equilibrium. Note Side Y initial loss in force is counter-
balanced by his superior rate of replenishment. (R = 2.5, R , 1.9).
1
s 3
However, side X "' superior C effectiveness (1.0 vs 0.4) enables him to
hold Y at a stalemate in steady state with 75% the rate of force repl en-
's 3ishment. It seems natural to describe side X superior c effectiveness
'
'Hillary, R.R., "Interactive Ordinary Differential
Equations Package", W.R. Church Computer Center, User's Guide to
WM/CMS at NPS, April 1981 .
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Table 6.2
Initial Conditions for Case b.) with
d at 0.4 and d at 1.0 (Stable)
xy yx v '








1 to 50 .05 1 .25 1.00 1 .00 1 .00 7
2 to 50 .05 1 .00 1.25 1 .00 1 .00 12
3 to 50 .05 1 .00 1.00 1 .25 1 .00 9
4 to 50 .05 1 .00 1 .00 1 .00 1 .25 10
5 to 50 .05 1 .25 1.25 1 .00 1 .00 17
6 to 50 .05 1 .25 1.00 1 .25 1 .00 1
7 to 50 .05 1 .25 1.00 1 .00 1 .25 1.5
3 to 50 .05 1 .00 1.25 1 .00 1 .25 1.5
9 to 50 .05 1 .00 1 .00 1 .25 1 .25 15.5
10 to 50 .05 1 .00 1.25 1 .25 1 .00 4.0
11 to 50 .05 1 .25 1.25 1 .25 1 .00 12.0
12 to 50 .05 1 .25 1.25 1 .00 1 .25 11.0
13 to 50 .05 1 .25 1 .00 1 .25 1 .25 12.0
14 to 50 .05 1 .00 1.25 1 .25 1 .25 4.0
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Table 6.3
Initial Conditions for Case b.) with
d at 1.4 and d at 1.0 (Unstable)
xy yx
Trial #1 Time Increment
I
X i h \ IncreasingForce Term
1 to 50 .05 1.25 1.00 1.00 1 .00 M
x
2 to 50 .05 1.00 1.25 1 .00 1 .00 M
X
3 to 50 .05 1.00 1 .00 1 .001 1.00 M
x
4 to 50 .05 1.00 1 .00 1.00 1.001 M
y
5 to 50 .05 1.25 1.25 1.00 1.00 M
x
6 to 50 .05 1.001 1.00 1.001 1 .00 M
y
7 to 50 .05 1 .001 1.00 1 .00 1 .001 M
y
8 to 50 .05 1 .00 1.00 1 .001 1 .001 M
y
9 to 50 .05 1 .00 1.001 1.00 1 .001 M
x
10 to 50 .05 1 .00 1.01 1.01 1 .00 M
y
11 to 50 .05 1.25 1.25 1.25 1 .00 M
X
12 to 50 .05 1.25 1 .25 1 .00 1.25 M
x
13 to 50 .05 1.001 1 .000 1.001 1.001 M
y
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as giving him a "force multiplication factor" of 4/3. In general, we
shall define
's
as X " force multiplication factor versus Y where u is the surface in
the parameter space p that produces a stable equilibrium point at unity,
Figure 6.5 corresponds to Trial #2 in Table 6.2. Here the phase plot
illustrates how a temporary increase in knowledge for side X gives X a
temporary gain in forces of about 4% and Y a temporary decrease in force
level of about 7%. However, due to the system parameters, X ' advantage
is in fact only temporary and the natural dynamic relationships between
the variables of the system drive it back to equilibrium.
Figure 6.6 corresponds to Trial #6 of Table 6.2. Here both X and Y
have initial information levels greater than their equilibrium values by
25%. The phase plot shows how initially both forces levels decrease,
then Y appears to be gaining an advantage over X (Y is using deception),
but slowly closes the gap and the force levels return to equilibrium
(M n = M „ = 1.0).v xe ye '
It must be emphasized that the dynamics shown are those that occur
if neither X nor Y change any of their policies, doctrines or efforts
(parameters are held constant). One might, if he sees his force
dimishing, attempt to change his fortunes by doctrinal or policy or
motivational improvement.
For example, Y, seeing that he is losing, as in the initial phases
3
of Trial #2, Figure 6.5, might be able to increase his C effectiveness
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parameter variation has altered the system to an unstable mode and
one side or the other will tend to win. Unfortunately for Y, if X
is initially at a force advantage, X will tend to win, as is shown
in Figures 6.7 and 6,8. These figures corresponds to Trial #2 of
Table 6.3, the table of numerical trials for the unstable case "(b-u)"
in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. The other trials of Table 6.3 do show that
if Y can gain an advantage along with his doctrinal or procedural
improvement he can in fact winl
The behavior exhibited by this system is indicative of "environmentally
unstable" systems, systems where relatively small parameter changes cause
dramatic changes in the dynamic behavior. Furthermore, the fact that when
unstable, either X or Y may win, depending upon who achieves the first
slight advantage, which may of course be by chance, even though Y has the
most effective force (d > d ), is illustrative of what is called a
bifurcation. If only Y can win in the unstable case, regardless of which
side gains the initial advantage, there is no bifurcation. It is obviously
important to know whether an unstable equilibrium point exhibits this
property.
Finally, Figure 6.7 demonstrates another very interesting phenomenon.
The unstable system is only unstable at the unity equilibrium point. In
fact, there is another equilibrium point at
{M . = 3.206, I , = 1.647, M . = .228, I , = .405}
xe xy ye ye
which is stable and the system comes to steady state at this point.
Although X has a distinct force and information advantage over Y, Y is
resupplying both men and materials and intelligence fast enough that X































































In the example described in this section, there are as we have
previously pointed out, four equilibrium points. We have found two,
one by design at unity and the other by chance through numerical trials.
One of these two is unstable but the second is stable and the system
will gravitate to the stable point. It is important to note that both
of these points are in the physically realizable region of the four-
dimensional space of our four species. All species must be real, non-
negative numbers to be physically realized. The locations of the other
two equilibria for this example are still unknown.
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VII. Discussion
The problem of accounting for the importance of C and intelligence
information on the outcome of military conflicts - individual battles or
entire campaigns - has been attacked in this paper by mathematical modeling
with evolution equations. The four species model we have proposed here
has the following major benefits:
1. It predicts both dynamic and average or steady state force levels.
2. It is non-linear, which appears imperative in order to account
for the relationships between forces and information.
3. Because it is non-linear, there are multiple possible steady
state solutions, some of which may be stable and some of which
may be unstable.
3
4. The parameters of the model can be directly associated with C I
3 3
features such as C effectiveness, counter-C (including deception,
jamming, spoofing, etc.), intelligence information, and information
"ageing" or "time late"
5. Force model includes ordinary aimed fire and area fire terms in
3
addition to the C I related terms.
3
6. A natural expression occurs for the force multiplier of C I in
terms of the ratio of rates of resupply required to maintain
equal forces in the field.
The Vol terra structure for evolution equations, which contains
constant as well as linear and quadratic terms, was selected primarily
because of its mathematical tractability (some major mathematical
problems remain even with these equations). However, one can think of
this model as containing the first two sets of terms in a power series
expansion of the true attrition functions, whatever they may be. This
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type of argument has been made in the ecosystem modeling literature
[May, op. sit.]. Whether it is valid or not for conflict modeling
needs more discussion.
What can the model tell us? Assuming we can get the parameters
somewhat nearly right, by analysis of data or through simulation, it can
1) tell us the possible steady state force levels and, 2) define the
regions of the parameter space where they are stable and the regions
where they are unstable. If a point is stable we can, 3) determine the
characteristic time constants and oscillatory frequencies of the system
when operating in the neighborhood of the stable point. If a point is
unstable we can determine 4) what type of perturbations will cause one
side or another to win (or in a stochastic model, the probability one
side or the other will win) as well as the characteristic time constants
for the system to diverge. Finally, for stable equilibrium points, we
can 5) define the force multiplication due to improved intelligence, C
3
and counter-C .
It is clear that the model proposed here is capable of exhibiting
a great variety of behaviors, behaviors not unlike those found in actual
military conflicts. There are, however, clearly a great many issues that
need additional thought and in some cases justification. First, there
remain some important mathematical problems. First among these is the
problem of locating the remaining equilibrium points and determining their
stability. (Recall that only one can presently be determined analytically).
There are several possible approaches to this problem including:
1.) Lyaponov Functions (Finding one for the model)
2.) Bifurcation Theory
3.) Continuation Methods (Numerical approach)
4.) A method of scaling similar to that used in Chap IV of this paper.
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The second major mathematical problem relates to the extraordinary
dependence of the eigenvalues of the Conflict Matrix, and hence system
stability, on the linear terms in the equations. This needs further
investigation and clarification. Put simply the quadratic terms are
essential to the determination of the several possible steady state
solutions, but the linear terms seem most important in determining their
stability or lack thereof, i.e. whether or not the system can stay at a
particular stationary point.
We also need to look at restructuring the model into a system of
discrete time difference equations. This approach is still amenable to
analysis. But it will more easily allow modeling of time delays in the
supply of both forces and information and control. Numerical analysis is
essentially unchanged.
Finally, we need to begin investigating means to test the model and
to determine reasonable values for the parameters. Unless this can be
done eventually, little ultimate gain will come from these efforts although
we will certainly be able to gain some insights into the relative merits of
3 3
various means of counter-C . Since it was the counter-C problem that
initiated these efforts originally, we shall pursue that application first.
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Appendix A
The General Mathematical Theory
Systems
We have a system of N first order non-linear differential equations of
the form
S = F (S) + Q (A-l)
This class of equations are known as evolution equations. S and Q are
Nxl column vectors and there are N functional relationships, which we
shall take here to be at most quadratic. If we make each function of the
form







the system is a yery generalized version of the Lotka-Vol terra equations
for multi-species eco-systems. The system then, that we shall study is as
in (A-l), but we write somewhat more explicitly that
Equil ibrium Points
We are interested in the set of vectors, S for which all the rates are
~e
zero, i.e., for which S = 0. Since the system is non-linear, there will
be a number of these vectors, and the nonlinearity of the system makes
their determination, in general, exceedingly difficult. However, there
is a yery ingenious way to determine one equilibrium vector from the
solution of a linear system of equations. We rewrite equations (A-2) as
follows:
N \ N
S.[ y a, . S. -
ll j=i 1J V j=i
7 a. . S. S . + Q. S,S u ie j H i i (A-3)
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Though we don't know S. , we know it is constant and that when
s = o, s = s
e
.




+ aU ) S je = Q i for i=l,2,..N
or in matrix notation
























(loss per capita per capita)
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Before passing to the issue of neighborhood stability, it is worth
remarking that frequently we may wish to establish equilibrium for some
specific value of S and find what the relationships among the coeffi-
cients must be in order to achieve this. A particularly useful point to
select is S =1. This makes all our species positive (a most desirable
feature), and simplifies the mathematics, as we shall see. One caution;
because the equations are nonlinear, dynamical solutions will not simply
scale in accordance with scaling the equilibrium point, so care must be




For S = 1 we have
~e





= so that unity
S = 1
is indeed an equilibrium point for the system of (A-7).
Neighborhood Stability
We can study the dynamic behavior of the system yery close to S = S
by a standard perturbation method. We proceed as follows
Let S = S + s
~e


























s = s (A-ll)
Also note that F(S ) + Q = (definition of an equilibrium point) so
that we have the linear, first order homogeneous state equations
S = Cs (A-12)
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The solution may be found by direct integration but its properties
are most easily analyzed by transformation to the LaPlace domain.*
p S(p) - C S(p) = s(0) (A-13)
Here s(0) are the initial conditions (displacement from equilibrium)
and p is the Laplacian operator. We are thus interested in matrix
equation
S(p) = (p I - C)"
1
s(0) (A-14)
Each term of the inverse, (jd I-C)~ , will contain the Det[pl - C]
in its denominator. This determinate will be an N order polynomial,
D(p), if the system has N species, and thus have N roots. In the







(P- Pl )(p-P 2 )..(p-Pn )
(A ' 15)
where D(p) = (p-p, )(p-p
2
)...(p-p ) is the factored characteristic
equation. Assuming the roots are distinct, and none correspond to poles
of N.(p), the time domain solution (inverse LaPlace of (A-15))will have
the form
N




Therefore, when the roots {p.} have negative real parts, lie in the
left half of the complex plan (LHP), the perturbations die out with time
and the system is said to have neighborhood stability. If any of the
roots lie in the RHP, the system will be unstable, i.e. the smallest
perturbation from equilibrium will grow without bound (in the linearized,
or perturbation, system at least) and the equilibrium point is said to
have neighborhood in stability. If the roots are purely complex, the
it
Solution of (A-12) is a well established subject (See, e.g.
Truxal , J.G., Introductory Systems Engineering , McGraw-Hill, 1972.
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system will oscillate indefinitely and is said to be neutrally stable.
(The simplest form of the prey-predator equations are neutrally stable},
The roots of the characteristic polynomial
D(_p) = Det p I - C are called the eigenvalues of the
matrix C. Therefore, we learn a great deal about the stability of our
system merely by studying the eigenvalues of the NXN matrix C. The
matrix C, in ecology, is called the "Community Matrix". In our work,
we shall refer to it as the "Conflict Matrix".
The Conflict Matrix





that is, the coefficients of the first term of the Taylor series expansion
of F. (S) about S . Now the off-diagonal terms are easily seen from
(A-3) to be
c . . = - S.a. . - a . . S .
ij 1 ij ij ie
= - S. Cct. . + a. .)
ie ij ij ;
S = S.
(A-17)
The diagonal terms are
N









S. -a..S. -a..S.je i1 ie n ie
S
ie




Thus, the conflict matrix becomes, for S = 1
C =-
an a i2













or simply, at the unity equilibrium point,
C =- I + a + A
where V is a diagonal matrix whose elements are equal to the sums
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